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Child v. Parent in
Tort: A Case for the Jury?
Some courts have recently abandoned the doctinne
of parental immunity from liability to a child for
personal tort. A tentative draft of the Restatement
of Torts, Second, recognizes ths development by
substituting for the immunity doctrine a parental
privilege to use "reasonable force for disciplinary
purposes only. Professor Coopernder examines these
changes and concludes that the Restatement position
inaccurately states the law and is unsound in
principle.

Luke K. Cooperrider*
IN 1934 the Restatement of Torts carried the statement, as
an introduction to its exposition of the privilege to use force to discipline children, that the privilege had no application to a parentchild disciplinary situation because
there is no case which indicates any tendency to bring the relation of
parent and child as such, including its duties and privileges, within the
scrutiny of the courts at the coiplaint of the child in an action of tort.
The only protection for the child is the parent's amenability to criminal
punishment if he exceeds the privilege accorded to him by law.1
Having made this statement, the text proceeded in the succeeding
sections to define the circumstances under which persons other than
a parent might be protected by a privilege in the application of
force to a child for disciplinary purposes. Naturally the extent of
the privilege was stated in terms of a reasonable relation to its legitimate objective, the establishment or maintenance of a proper
state of discipline.2 Although the Restatement apparently did not
take a position, except to the extent indicated above, it was also
true that the well established law at the same time precluded recovery by an unemancipated child against the parent for other personal torts, particularly negligent personal injury.
This common law position was derived from a series of cases
originating in 1891, in the first of which, Hewlett v. George,4 a Mississippi court held, solely on the authority of its own opinion of
* Professor of Law, Umversity of Michigan Law School.
1. 1 R STATEmENT, TORTS, Scope Note §§ 147-55 (1934).

2. Id. §§ 148-52.

3. PRossEa, ToRTs 675-76 (2 ed. 1955). See also cases cited notes 11 and 12 infra.
4. 68 Miss. 703,9 So. 885 (1891).
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sound public policy, that it would be subversive of the peace of the
family and of society to permit a minor child to assert a claim
against his parent for civil redress of personal injuries "so long as
the parent is under obligation to care for, guide and control, and
the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and
obey .....

The case involved a claim, asserted by a once mar-

ried minor daughter against her mother, that the defendant had
wrongfully caused the plaintiff to be confined in an insane asylum
without proper commitment. The decision seems to have struck a
responsive chord, for within a few years after it was handed down
a similar position was taken by a number of other American courts,
a fact in itself curious when it is noted that before 1891 the question had apparently never been directly raised in the common law
jurisdictions.
The first cases involved malicious, or at least intentional, wrongs.'
There were dicta, but no direct decisions, to the contrary. For
example, in Haycraft v. Grigsby 7 a Missouri Court of Appeals, in
holding that a child might maintain an action against a teacher for
immoderate punishment, stated that "persons are not allowed to
immoderately beat and injure either children or adults from any
motive good or bad; parents have no such right, nor teachers
either."" This lead was followed twelve years later by another Missouri appeals decision, but again in a case where at most the defendant stood in loco parentis, and there was a fact question of
whether the relation rose any higher than that of master and servant.' In Clasen v. Pruhso the defendant was an aunt who stood in
loco parentis at the time of the claimed injuries, but the court assumed the case to be governed by the rules applicable to a parentchild relation. It is interesting to note that this group of cases
apparently involved action by the defendant which at least was
claimed to have been disciplinary in nature, while the group of
cases above asserting the rule of nonliability do not seem to have
involved such a claim.
The negligence cases followed somewhat later, but accepted the
lead of the Hewlett case without much argument, in an industrial
5. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
6. Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill.
App. 577 (1895); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 560, 142
N.E. 128 (1924); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 888, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
7. 88 Mo. App. 354 (1901).
8. Id. at 360. Citing somewhat similar statements made in Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114 (1859), under similar facts.
9. Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913). See also Tresehman v.
Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 560,
142 N.E. 128(1924).
10. 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903).
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accident case in Minnesota"' in 1908, and in automobile accident
cases inNorth Carolina in 1923, Rhode Island in 1925, Michigan
in 1926, Wisconsin in 1927, New York in 1928 and Connecticut in
1929."2 Only in North Carolina, where the majority saw the prob-

lem as an issue between the Ten Commandments and Russian Communism, and the dissenter viewed it as a question of whether the
court should recognize the God-given freedom of its women and
children from the tyrant's heel of husband and father, or knuckle
under to the "legislation" of the Mississippi court, did the controversy generate much heat. There was, however, a dissent in Wisconsin, and a dissent without opinion by Cardozo, Crane and
Andrews to the New York per curiam opinion. On through the '30s
and '40s the doctrine continued to gain support, principally in automobile negligence cases, with relatively little challenge. It was criticized in detail by Professor McCurdy' and by Chief Justice Peaslee, 4 and these criticisms were joined by a chorus of student
laments in law reviews. The net result during this period, however,
was some case authority for an exception to the rule in situations
where the parent had negligently caused injury to the child while
carrying on business (as distinguished from a family) activity
which was covered by insurance; 0 some cautious dicta indicating
doubt as to the propriety of applying the rule where the parent is
guilty of malicious or intentional injury, 0 and one case refusing to
"extend" the rule to cover a "voluntary tort" (homicide by poisoning) committed by an adoptive parent.' 7
The criticisms of McCurdy and Peaslee had had their effect, however, perhaps aided and abetted by a general change in attitude
toward the family as an institution, and 1950 can be ascertained as
the year in which the rule's decay really began. In that year the
Oregon court approved a death action against the estate of a father
who, while grossly intoxicated, had required his minor son, against
the latter's will, to accompany him on an automobile trip across the
11. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908).
12. Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929); Elias v. Collins, 237
Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551
(1928); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese,
47 RI. 131,131 At. 198 (1925); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
13. McCurdy, Torts Between Personsin Domestic Relation, 43 HAv. L. Rev. 1030,
1056 (1930).
14. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,150 AtL. 905 (1930).
15. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 14; Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, S.E.2d 343
(1939); Lusk v.Lusk, 113W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). Contra: Rambo v. Rambo,
195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938) (srmble); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13
N.E.2d 438 (1938); Belleson v. Skllbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.V. 1 (1932).
16. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Matarese v. Matarese,
47 ILL 131, 131 AtL 198 (1925); Securo v. Securo, 110 V. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931).
17. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939).
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Oregon Cascades, with results that were fatal to both. Summing up
its position, the court said:
[W]e think the general rule -so well established by the authorities should be modified to allow an unemancipated minor child to maintain an
action for damages against his parent for a wilful or malicious personal
tort. The evidence in the instant action certainly shows that the decedentfather was guilty of wilful misconduct.' 8

A few months later the Maryland court sustained an action
brought by a daughter against the estate of her father to recover
damages for shock, mental anguish, and consequent nervous and
physical injury when it was alleged that the deceased, when the
child was 5, had shotgunned her mother to death in her presence,
kept her in the presence of the body for six days, and finally killed
himself with the shotgun in her presence. 19 Accepting as the justification for the immunity rule the stereotype which had developed in
the cases, i.e., that it was designed to promote tranquillity and discipline in the family, the court felt that under the circumstances
these values were not jeopardized by allowing a claim by the plaintiff. Its conclusions were stated in these terms: "Justice demands
that a minor child shall have a right of action against a parent for
injuries resulting from cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs." 20
Such invitations are seldom long ignored. The necessary allegations of "wilful, wanton and malicious" conduct soon blossomed
forth, levelled this time at husbands, fathers, and even mothers.t
In succeeding years the distinction suggested earlier, holding the
parent liable for an injury negligently inflicted while he was acting
in a business rather than parental "capacity," also gained some further support.22 The one aspect of the original immunity which still
remains untouched is that which protects the parent from liability
for mere negligence within the bosom of the family. Even here the
risk-spreaders are at work, seeking to convert the automobile lia18. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 301, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (1950.
19. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).

20. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.

21. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Wright v. Wright, 85
2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525
Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.
(1956); Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (mother

accused of "wilfully, wantonly and culpably" operating her automobile in such a way
as to cause her child to suffer a fractured skull); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577,
74 S.E.2d 170 (1953). The allegations were held sufficient to state a cause of action in
all except the Brumfield case.
22. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.
2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). In these cases the existence, vel non, of liability insurance
was held irrelevant. In Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953), Levesque
v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954), and Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d
302 (1954) the authority for the proposition in the text was noted, but held inapplicable.
Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), is apparently contra.
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bility insurance policy into a family accident policy by requiring
the driver's liability insurer to compensate his child's injury.23 So
far the courts have not accepted that proposition.
In reviewing the cases it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
here is a battle that has been fought largely by straw men. Almost
everybody seems to agree that the intra-family tort is a special
situation which the courts should handle with caution. The difficulty comes in trying to develop the proper criteria for judicial intercession. Without much thought the early opinions justified the
immunity position by reference to the social necessity for preserving the "tranquillity" and "discipline" of the family, and did so in
such a way that they could be construed as referring to conditions
existing within the family before the court. This reasoning was quite
vulnerable because the critic could always argue the absurdity of
a rule having as its objective the preservation of conditions which
were obviously nonexistent.
On the other side the thinking was afflicted by a bete noire, the
case of Roller v. Roller,2 4 in which the defendant escaped civil liability, although already languishing in prison, for the rape of his
minor daughter. The Washington court has been ridiculed unmercifully for justifying this decision on disciplinary grounds, and the
shafts directed its way have apparently gone home, for it has recently subjected itself to a painful self criticism and confessed the
error of its ways.25
-Muchof this criticism was unfair, or at least inapt, based on different assumptions of the latitude which a court may have in applying or withholding the application of a rule of law under varying
circumstances of fact. From the beginning it should have been
apparent that the reason for the rule lay not in the future of the
particularfamily, but in the future of the institution itself. Judge
Learned Hands justification of the absolute privilege enjoyed by
judicial and quasi-judicial officers from civil liability for their official acts offers a pertinent analogy.
[I]f it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty,
it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so
is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until
the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as
well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger
of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again
and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be
founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find him23. Ehrenzweig, ParentalImmunity in the Conflict of Laws, 23 U. Cm. L. R-.
478 (1956); HABpra & JAlmss, TORTS § 8.11 (1956).

24. 37 Wash. 242,79 Pac. 788 (1905).
25. Borstv. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642,251 P.2d 149 (1952).

474,
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self hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed
be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties;

but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly
mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so
often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils

inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the
end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of

retaliation.2 6

It was not that the court feared to visit upon Roller the consequences of his misdeeds, but that courts are required to
rely upon certain uniform principles of law, and, if it be once established
that a child has a right to sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical line
of demarkation which can be drawn; for the same principle which would
allow the action in the case of a heinous crime, like the one involved in
this case, would allow an action to be brought for any other tort. The
principle permitting the 27action would be the same. The torts would be
different only in degree.

At least some of the critics of the rule of the Hewlett case seem to
accept with equanimity the development which the Washington
court foresaw. Others have argued only that the court in the
Roller case did not have sufficient faith in the ability of the American court and jury to distinguish between cases.2 9 One student commentator suggested that the problem simply be unloaded on the
jury by instructing it to find whether the defendant's conduct was
"consistent with the reasonable performance of the marital or family
duties." " Those of us who are not so charmed by the prospect of a
law formulated completely by the jury for each individual case may
have some difficulty with this proposition. Yet this is substantially
the solution proffered by the Restatement of Torts, Second, in Tentative Draft No. 1, for those jurisdictions which have rejected the
complete immunity position of Hewlett v. George.
In their scope note the Restaters Second now propose to acknowledge that in some jurisdictions, though still not in most, a child may
maintain a civil action against his parent for personal injuries intentionally or wantonly inflicted, and to suggest that in such states
the parent's privilege of discipline becomes important as affecting
his tort liability. In section 147 it is then proposed to provide, subsection (1), that a parent is privileged to apply such reasonable
force or impose such reasonable confinement upon his child as he
reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 244, 79 Pac. 788, 789 (1905).
PnossmL, TORTS 676-77 (2d ed. 1955).
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,363, 150 Atl. 905, 910 (1930).
Note, Tort Liability Within the Family Area, 51 Nw. U.L. Riv. 610, 619 (1956).
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or education. Comment d, under subsection (1), explains that the
parent's privilege is more extensive than that of other persons who
may also be privileged, but that he is, nevertheless, subject to an
"objective" standard of reasonableness under the circumstances, one
of which is his relationship to the child and superior knowledge of
the child. Justifying this position the reporter refers to the fact that
"even" in criminal cases the older principle which excused the parent if he had acted in good faith has given away to an "objective"
standard of reasonableness. In section 150 it is then proposed to list
six factors to be considered (by the jury, undoubtedly) in determining whether force or confinement used in a particular case was
reasonable "for the control, training or education" of the child, including the identity of the defendant (i.e., parent or not), age, sex,
and condition of the child, "nature of his offense and his apparent
motive," the influence of his example upon other children of the
same family or group, whether the force or confinement was reasonably necessary to compel obedience to a proper command, and
whether it was disproportionate to the offense, necessarily degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm. This provision is
followed by several paragraphs of homely advice (comments c, d,
and e) explaining and exemplifying how these various factors may
bear upon the decision as to reasonableness in a given case, e.g.,
that the punishment must be "reasonably proportionate" to the offense, and perhaps to the character of the offender, that the ringleader may receive more severe punishment than the others, that
a girl should not be punished so severely as a boy, that punishment
should not be used at all unless necessary and only to the extent
necessary to compel obedience, etc. Now these are all, undoubtedly,
admirable guideposts to establish for a jury charged with the duty
of examining the conduct of school teacher or camp counselor. With
all due respect however, I submit that to subject a parent to the
possibility of this kind of an inquisition into his conduct of the affairs of his family is a horse of another color. It would, perhaps,
be unfair to criticise the Restatement for adopting this position if
it represented the result of the cases, but it does not. None of the
recent cases which have denied the existence of an absolute immunity have involved a disciplinary situation. Their comments,
therefore, are all dicta, but insofar as they have spoken they do
31
not support the Restatement proposition. In Dunlap v. Dunlap,
which is the leading case favoring at least a measure of liability,
Chief Justice Peaslee conceded that
for mistaken judgment as to the extent of chastisement, or for negligent
disrepair of the home the father provides, there is usually no liability.
31. 84 N.H. 352,150 AtL 905 (1930).
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These acts all grow out of and pertain to the relation of parent and child.
The relation gives rise to the duty alleged to have been violated. .

.

. But

there may be acts which clearly are not to be referred to such relation.
The father who brutally assaults his son or outrages his daughter, ought
not to be heard to plead his parenthood and the peace 3of2 the home as
answers to an action seeking compensation for the wrong.

And later:
[T]he cases relied upon by the defendant seem to put the parent in the
position of a king, who can do no wrong. The true theory appears to us
to be that in the discharge of parental duty his position is rather comparable to that of a judge, not accountable
for errors, but responsible
33
when he oversteps his jurisdiction.

In other places throughout the opinion the chief justice made it
apparent that he was suggesting, in a situation where defendant
might be in a position to claim the disciplinary privilege, only a

liability for "intentional injury maliciously inflicted."

Mahnke v. Moore 4 relied mainly on Peaslee's reasoning, and
added nothing to it on the point in question. In Cowgill v. Boock 11
the court equated the defendant's conduct to cruelty, and a concur-

ring opinion indicated "the parent should not be held liable for chastisement which he administered as head of the household.
...
30
In Wright v. Wright the court suggested that the action must be

based on such "cruelty" as would warrant a court in depriving the
parent of further custody.
the following opinion:

In Borst v. Borst the court expressed

In all the family activities, the parents and children are living and working
together in close relationship, with neither the possibility of dealing with
each other at arm's length, as one stranger to another, nor the desire to
so deal. The duty to discipline the child carries with it the right to chastise
and to prescribe a course of conduct designed for the child's development
and welfare. This in turn demands that the parents be given a wide sphere
of discretion.
In order that these parental duties may adequately be performed, it
is necessary that the parents be not subject to the risk of suit at the hands
of their children. If such suits were common-place, or even possible, the
freedom and willingness of the father and mother to provide for the needs,
comforts and pleasures of the family would be seriously impaired. Public
policy therefore demands that parents be given immunity from such suits
while in the discharge of parental duties.-...
We do not determine the question of whether the immunity should be
absolute or conditional with respect to3 8acts performed in the discharge of
parental duties, as it is not before us.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 361, 150 Atl. at 909.
Id. at 363, 150 At. at 910.
197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
Id. at 304, 218 P.2d at 454 (concurring opinion).
85 Ga. App. 721,726, 70 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1952).
41 Wash. 2d 642, 656, 251 P2d. 149, 156 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
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Only in Emery v. Emery 3 did the court express an opinion,
obiter and without citation of authority, as to the extent of the
privilege which would tend to support the Restatements position:
Since the law imposes on the parent a duty to rear and discipline his
child and confers the right to prescribe a course of reasonable conduct
for its development, the parent has a wide discretion in the performance
of his parental functions, but that discretion does not include the right
wilfully to inflict personal injuries beyond the limits of reasonable parental
discipline. No sound public policy would be subserved by extending it
beyond those limits.

Let us now examine the earlier cases, which did have something
to say about the disciplinary situation. The authority is sketchy,
and largely dictum, but a brief reference to the language will give
some flavor of the thinking the courts indulged. In Lander v.
Seaver,4' for instance, the court was considering the conduct of a
schoolmaster who had ministered to one of his charges with a rawhide. It said, in this connection, that considerable latitude should
be given to the teacher for the exercise of discretion, and he should
not be held liable unless the punishment he administered was
"clearly excessive." Before reaching this conclusion the court rejected the defendant's claim that he was entitled to the same privilege as a parent, and said about the latter:
The parent, unquestionably, is answerable only for malice or wicked
motives or an evil heart in punishing his child. This great and to some
extent irresponsible power of control and correction is invested in the
parent by nature and necessity. It springs from the natural relation of
parent and child. It is felt rather as a duty than a power. From the intimacy and nature of the relation, and the necessary character of family
government, the law suffers no intrusion upon the authority of the parent,
and the privacy
of domestic life, unless in extreme cases of cruelty and
41
injustice.

Haycraft v. Grigsby,4 again considering punishment meted out by
a schoolmaster, comes no closer to a statement on the parent's privilege than that already quoted above.

In Dix v. Martin43 the court approved an instruction to the jury
submitting the question whether defendant stood in loco parentis
to plaintiff, or whether there was only a master-servant relation, on
the theory that in the latter case defendant had no privilege at all
to inflict corporal punishment. An alternative instruction presented
the issue-was the punishment so unreasonable, cruel and exces39. 45 Cal. 2d 421, 429, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955). Nudd v. Matso -ukas,
7 111 2d
608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956), is of no assistance here since it does not consider the
question.
40. 32 Vt. 115 (1859).
41. Id. at 122. (Emphasis added.)
42. 88 Mo. App. 354 (1901).
43. 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913).
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sive as to constitute an assault regardless of the relation between
the parties? Under this branch of the submission, the court said:
One who assumes to take the place of a parent has a right to inflict reasonable corporal punishment for misconduct of the child, but he has no right
to subject the child to inhuman, unusual and torturing castigation and if

he does he becomes liable to answer to the child in damages as for a malicious assault. . . The evidence shows beyond question that defendant,
in her furious wrath over what amounted to nothing more than a breach
of decorum, subjected the child to an unusual form of punishment of such
severity and brutality
as to shock the conscience of any reasonable and
44
humane person.

(The child was beaten with a buggy whip until her back was covered with bruises and welts from which blood and other fluid

oozed.) In Treschman v. Treschman4 5 the only pertinent comment
is a quotation from Reeve's Domestic Relations which the court
cited with approval, although the issue discussed was the sufficiency
of the complaint rather than the nature of the privilege:
In Reeve's Domestic Relation, (4th ed.) 357, in discussing the right and
duty of a parent to correct his minor child, the author says: "the true
ground on which this ought to be placed, I apprehend, is, that the parent
ought to be considered as acting in a judicial capacity when he corrects,
and, of course, not liable for errors of opinion; and although the punishment should appear to the triers to be unreasonably severe, and in no
measure proportioned to the offense, yet, if it should also appear that the
parent acted conscientiously, and from motives of duty, no verdict ought
to be found against him. But when the punishment is, in their opinion,
thus unreasonable, and it appears that the parent acted, malo animo, from
wicked motives, under the influence of an unsocial heart, he ought to be
liable for damages. For error of opinion, he ought to be excused; but for
malice of heart, he must not be shielded from the just claims of the
child." 46

Clasen v. Pruhs4T more nearly supports the Re-Restaters' position
than any of the other cases. The defendant was an aunt with whom
plaintiff had lived, and the treatment complained of apparently was
disciplinary in nature. It was conceded that defendant stood in loco
parentis, and the court assumed the case to be governed by the rules
applying to the parent-child relation. The appeal concerned the
validity of the instructions, after verdict in favor of plaintiff. In an
opinion written by the commissioners it is said:
A parent, teacher or master is not liable either civilly or criminally for
moderately correcting a child, pupil or apprentice, but it is otherwise if
the correction is immoderate and unreasonable. 1 Clark & Marshall, Law
44. Id. at 274, 157 S.W. at 136. (Emphasis added.)
45. 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901).
46. Id. at 211, 61 N.E. at 963.
47. 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903).
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of Crimes, 433; 1 McClain, Criminal Law, sec. 242; 3 Creenleaf, Evidence (16th ed.), sec. 63; 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (10th ed.), see. 631.
In fact, this rule seems to be universally recognized by the courts of this
country. If the authority to punish be limited by reason and moderation,
who, then, on sound principles, should determine whether such authority
has been used in excess of its proper limits, the parent administering the
punishment, or the triers of fact in a court where complaint has been
made? While some authority is cited tending to support the theory that,
where the punishment falls short of maiming or disfiguring the body or
seriously injuring or endangering life and health, the judgment of the
parent is final and he can not be held to answer, unless it is proved that
the punishment was maliciously inflicted-the leading case in support of
this doctrine being State v. Jones, 95 N. Car. 588, 59 Am. Rep. 282- yet
the great weight of American authority seems to be that whether or not
the parent, guardian or schoolmaster has administered unreasonable, unnecessary and cruel punishment to a child under his care, is a question of
fact to be determined by the jury. [Citing here 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law
(1st ed.), 771; Lander v. Seaver; Pattersonv. Nutter, 78 Me. 509; and
five criminal cases.] It would, therefore, seem that the learned trial court
followed the trend of a long line of well considered cases when he submitted to the jury the question of the reasonableness of the punishment
inflicted, and predicated plaintiff's right of recovery on proof of the fact
that the punishment administered
was unreasonable and unnecessary un48
der all the circumstances.
The reliance on criminal law authority is emphasized because the

Re-Restaters have taken the same course, a course which seems to
me to be subject to question. The opinion of the court itself, though

it affirmed the commissioners' results, less clearly supports the ReRestaters' position. Again the only authority cited consists of criminal cases and treatises on crimes. The instructions under considera-

tion are not quoted in full, and the discussion pertaining to them is
rather unsatisfactory. In its most lucid part the opinion says:
There is no doubt that, in the condition of the record, the defendant was
entitled to have the jury plainly instructed as to the right and duty of the
parent to exercise a reasonable and just discretion in correcting the faults
of a child, and that the law will not hold the parent liable for an honest
mistake of judgment in estimating the character of the fault corrected, or
in determining the quality and degree of punishment necessary to correct
the fault. This discretion of the parent must be confined within reasonable
limits. Unnatural and inhuman punishment furnishes conclusive evidence
of a malicious motive in the parent administering it. Punishment may be
so plainly excessive, although not causing permanent injury, as to overcome the presumption that the parent had solely in view the welfare of
the child. So that, after all, the question is whether under all the circumstances of the case, after allowing due latitude for the exercise of parental
authority and discretion, the punishment was in fact excessive and un- 49
necessary, and this question must necessarily be determined by the jury.
48. Id. at 283,95 N.W. at 642.
49. Id. at 292, 95 N.V. at 645 (concurring opinion).
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It will thus be seen that the civil cases which have said anything
on the question seem clearly to indicate that a parent's conduct is
not to be measured against the same yardstick of "reasonableness"
which is applied to those who may have a special or temporary custody of the child. It has been thought, rather, that he should be free
of liability absent a type of conduct which has been variously described as malicious, evil of motive, cruel, inhuman, unusual, or
clearly excessive. 50
The one case which looks the other direction relies solely on criminal law authority. The Re-Restaters do likewise. Of the dozen cases
they cite for the proposition that there has been a change in the
criminal law away from a privilege based on the absence of malice
in favor of a privilege based on mere reasonableness, only one"' appears to me clearly to support their conclusion. In the other cases
the references to the parent's obligation not to exceed the bounds of
reason or "moderation" are so general and incidental as to give no
indication that the court was consciously considering the exact limits of the privilege. If the statement made concerning the state of
the criminal law be conceded, however, it does not follow that the
same rule does or should apply in the area of civil liability. The risk
that the criminal courts will inject themselves into the family scene
is certainly far less than that the civil courts may be required to
do so if the proposed rule is generally adopted. Action by the state is
within the control of a prosecuting official who is not unlikely to permit himself to be encumbered by minor family disturbances, whereas the civil courts must act at the behest of any citizen who believes
himself aggrieved. Further, the whole atmosphere of a criminal
prosecution, with its concern for the rights of the defendant, the
presumption of innocence, and the "beyond reasonable doubt" burden of proof would suggest that it is far less likely that a parent
would be convicted of an "unreasonable chastisement" under a criminal charge of assault and battery than that he might be so convicted
in the analogous civil action.
50. The "wanton and wilful misconduct" cases present a different question, although
they were, via Cowgill v. Boock, supranote 35, derived from this same language. lore,
as in other contexts, this talismanic phrase is used to evade the rule which excludes liability for negligence. The immediate consequence of its recognition as a basis of liability
here will be to give the "wanton and wilful" driver the windfall benefit of a family
accident insurance for which he has not paid. No doubt the liability insurers will take
this development into account either by a general increase in rates or by excluding liability to members of the family. The latter expedient would seem preferable, for It is
surely equitable to expect those who wish accident protection to pay for it themselves as
they do for collision coverage and medical payments clauses, rather than pass the burden
on to the general motoring public. Aside from this consideration, there is of course the
further possibility that the "wanton and wilful" rubric will be the eventual downfall of
parental immunity from liability for intra-family negligence. My views on that prospect
are, I suppose, obvious.
51. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E.2d 419 (1947).
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Where a parent, or one who has assumed the place of a parent,
has in fact been guilty of brutal or bestial conduct toward his child
the communal sense of outrage has its proper outlet in the criminal
prosecution. If the conduct has inflicted permanent disability there is
reason to make an effort to see that that disability is in some manner
compensated, although taking into account the claims upon the defendant which other members of his family may have, and the likelihood that the assets will be sufficient to provide for all, there is at
least a doubt whether the common law action for assault and battery is the appropriate device to accomplish this objective. For anything short of permanent disability the appropriateness of that action is even more questionable. The concept of pecuniary "compensation" for personal injury appears an even more primitive idea ere
than in other contexts, where at least it is a substitute for personal
or tribal revenge. While the money judgment, as a forfeit yielded
by the wrongdoer to the wronged, may help assuage the community's desire to see retribution done, it is not likely to accomplish
anything of a positive nature for the unfortunate group of individuals most intimately concerned. Aside from punishment the great
need here is not retribution, but the assurance of care and support
for the child and for the rest of the family, who in all probability
have been victimized in a similar manner, albeit not so grievously.
it is possible, in other words, that these problems would be handled
more intelligently in custody and support proceedings than in a
common law action for damages, with its limited scope of investigation and remedial competence.
The vice of the rule proposed for the second Restatement shows
up mainly in the lower registers, however. Not only does it lower
the threshold of liability to the level of mere unreasonableness, as
determined by a jury after the fact; it also throws upon the parent
the burden of establishing to the satisfaction of said jury that his
conduct was reasonable. The issue is not likely to arise except in a
situation wherein the natural family ties, loyalties and restraints
have completely broken down, and been superseded by recrimination and a spirit of vendetta. This would be the atmosphere in which
the Restatement rule would have the parent's past contacts -withhis
children measured against the common law specifications for battery-or false imprisonment. (Or perhaps assault? Intentional infliction of mental distress? Invasion of privacy?) In any family
there are personal contacts, some in the spirit of play, others not so
playful but arising from the frictions of intimate coexistence, which
if they occurred between strangers would amount to batteries. The
logic of the rule would establish any such contact as a prima facie
cause of action (the least touching is a battery) in which, if it were
prosecuted, the plaintiff would perhaps be entitled to an instruction
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to the effect that the conduct, if not directed to the "control, training or education" of the child, was outside the scope of the privilege.
This may appear to be a preoccupation with technicalities, but of
just such technicalities are jury cases made, and unless it is thought
that every parent should be subject to the risk that conduct such as
this will engender liability, there should not be a rule which contemplates it. Besides which I am not at all sure that I am engaged
by mere windmills. Is it not written here between the lines that in
every settlement negotiation pending divorce where a child of the
marriage is involved one of the factors which must be considered
will be the possibility that a list of these jury cases could be compiled reaching back (the statute of limitations not running against
a minor) to the first time the harassed father, in his weakness, gave
way to mere irritation instead of calmly pursuing a reasoned and
reasonable course of instruction in good citizenship? Is it not also
written here that the child of the deceased, excluded by will for
reasons not likely to be all-persuasive to him from participation in
the estate, will bend his mind to the compilation of a similar catalog, as will also the prodigal son or daughter at the expense of those
remaining in the fold? Is it not even more apparent that in similar
situations it would not be difficult to call to mind instances in
which the father, honestly endeavoring to "control, train or educate"
the child, may have overstepped the bounds which a jury, under
the tutelage of artful counsel supported by the testimony of "experts" might be willing to consider reasonable?
This is the heart of the matter. The castle-like quality of the common law home is fast disappearing, and here is one more step toward
the reduction of this last sanctuary from the Damoclean peril of the
jury verdict. It is too high a price to pay for an empty satisfaction
in the completeness and symmetry of the law. The family, as an institution of social control, has a considerably longer history than
does the common law damage action with trial by jury, and I know
of no evidence which would indicate that the latter can accomplish
better results than the former in the area which has hitherto been
reserved to it. It is to me inadmissible that twelve strangers in a
jury box, played upon by able counsel in the interest of a more adequate award, should have the power of review over one's performance in his office of paterfamilias, with no restrictions upon their discretion except the standard of "reasonableness" as that standard is
typically applied by present day courts.
I submit, therefore, that the second Restatement's position is unsound. It is not supported by authority, and has nothing to recommend it except a tendency to bring this small compartment of the
law into alignment with other privileges to use force, to which it
bears no true analogy. This is not a sufficient recommendation, for
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most persons will, in the course of a lifetime, find themselves in a
situation where they must use force in defense of self or property
only very infrequently, if ever, so that the exposure is minimal,
whereas there is no limit to the exposure to a jury verdict which
would be the lot of every parent under the proposed rule. Nor is
it a justification for the rule that probably relatively few would actually be victimized. The rule is excessively obtrusive, and places
the courts in a position they ought not to be occupying.

